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         Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relationship between social trust and 
intelligence. The extreme bound analysis of Levine and Renelt is employed 
to directly assess the strength of the nexus. The findings confirm the 
positive and robust nexus between social trust and intelligence. We have 
contributed to the literature by confirming that the previously established 
positive linkage between intelligence and trust is not statistically fragile. In 
fact the nexus withstands further empirical scrutiny with more robust 
empirical strategies. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Trust has recently received increasing attention in the economic development literature. 
Scholars have paid particular attention to two broad dimensions of trust namely: its causes 
and consequences (see notably, Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Bjornskov, 2006; Wahl, 2012; 
Sturgis et al., 2010; Hooghe et al., 2012; Carl & Billari, 2014). In the underlying literature, 
emphasis has been placed on the consequences of human capital or its relationship with social 
trust (Coleman, 1988; Gradstein & Justman, 2000; Bassanini, & Scarpetta, 2002).  Bjørnskov 
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(2009) is also consistent with this stream of the literature. Whereas the trust variable has been 
used by Bjørnskov (2009) in the conditioning information set as a control variable, we employ 
it in this study as the dependent variable of interest. This note complements this stream of the 
literature by employing Leamer’s (1983, 1985) version of extreme bound analysis (EBA). 
Consistent with Levine and Renelt (1992), small changes in explaining variables are 
susceptible to affect the variable of interest.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology of 
EBA and describes corresponding data. The empirical results are presented in Section 3 while 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Extreme Bound Analysis  
The EBA employed for the sensitivity test is in accordance with Leamer and Leonard (1983) 
and Leamer (1985). The central insight of the EBA method is that a coefficient of theoretical 
interest is robust to the extent that this coefficient exhibits a small range of variation in the 
presence or absence of other explanatory variables (Hafner-Burton, 2005). 
The form of equation to estimate is as follows: 
 
where,  is the variable of interest to be explained, Xi is a vector of standard 
explanatory variables,  representing the intelligence quotient (IQ) is the main independent 
variable of interest, and  is a vector of potential additional explanatory variables or 
variables identified in past studies as important explanatory variables of Social trust.   
 
In accordance with Levine  and Renelt (1992, p. 944), this study computes the regression 
results for all feasible linear combinations of up to three Z-indicators and then identifies the 
lowest and highest values for the estimated coefficient of interest , which cannot be rejected 
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at a 95% confidence level. The level of significance corresponding to the partial correlation 
between IQ and social trust can be examined from extreme bounds of the estimated 
coefficient of interest . In the case where the estimated coefficient has the same sign at the 
extreme bounds and remains significant, a fair amount of confidence in the partial correlation 
can be maintained. Within this framework, robust findings can be inferred. Conversely, if the 
estimated coefficient changes in sign and losses its significance, then the confidence on a 
relationship between trust and IQ reduces because alterative control variables modify 
inferences that might be derived from the investigated nexus. Hence, the findings here are 
statistically fragile.  
 Sala-i-Martin (1997) has argued that Leamer’s criterion is strong. Whereas the author 
has proposed another EBA version, we employ Leamer’s approach because it has been 
documented to be a more robust criterion (see Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
Following the underlying literature, we use the trust indicator from the World Values 
Survey (WVS) which surveys the proportion of a population that answers “yes” to the 
fundamental question: ‘‘in general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or can’t you 
be too careful?’’. WVS data for a number of countries has been available since 1981 and is 
generally accepted as a reliable indicator of trust at the aggregate level. National social trust 
scores have proven to be fairly valid measures of honesty, trust and trustworthiness 
(Bjørnskov, 2006). Moreover, the indicator has been employed in a substantial bulk of the 
literature (Bjørnskov, 2006, 2009; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2012; Kodila-Tedika. & Asongu, 
2013).  
 The intelligence data is obtained from Meisenberg and Lynn (2011). Past versions of 
this dataset are available in Lynn and Vanhanen (2006). The dataset uses best practice 
methods to compile hundreds of national IQ average test scores during the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries. The average IQ is a general-purpose human capital indicator as well as a 
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measurement of a country’s quality of labor (see Hanushek & Kimko, 2000; Jones & 
Schneider, 2006; Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015ab).  The data has been substantially 
employed in the intelligence literature   (e.g. Weede & Kämpf, 2002 ; Jones & Schneider, 
2006 ; Ram, 2007 ; Potrafke, 2012 ;  Kodila-Tedika, 2014 ; Rindermann et al., 2014 ; Kodila-
Tedika & Mustacu, 2014 ; Kodila-Tedika & Bolito-Losembe, 2014). This data from 
Hanushek on the one hand and Lynn and Vanhanen on the other hand is continuously being 
improved (see Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011; 2012). 
In accordance with the trust literature (Bjornskov, 2006;  Wahl, 2012), we control for 
democracy, settlement duration, temperature, GDP per capita, trade openness, Years since 
agricultural transition, institutions, and ethnic fractionalization. GDP per capita and trade 
openness are obtained from Penn World Tables. The measure of ethnic fractionalization is 
from Alesina et al. (2003). As geographical controls, the temperature (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) 
and latitude of a country in absolute degrees are used (Parker, 1997). Institutional data is from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010). The data on communism is obtained from Kodila-Tedika and 
Kanyama-Kalonda (2014) while variables on Settlement duration and Years since the 
agricultural transition are respectively from Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and Putterman (2006). 
The variable on democracy is provided by Cheibub et al. (2010). The summary statistics of 
the variables is provided in Table 1. From the variations of variables, we can be confident that 
reasonable estimated linkages would emerge.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Social trust 113 25.452 13.399 3.4 64.270 
IQ 175 84.208 10.853 61.2 106.9 
G 140 8.871 1.188 5.903 11.173 
L 114 28.153 17.759 1 65 
C 109 0.193 0.396 0 1 
M 113 0.150 0.359 0 1 
D 140 0.657 0.476 0 1 
O 190 94.805 52.257 1.852 436.345 
I 181 -0.140 2.207 -4.894 4.592 
F 166 0.459 0.270 0 0.98 
S 144 6.183 4.903 0.12 16 
AT 165 4814.242 2453.842 362 10500 
ME 114 20.726 6.919 -7.634 28.194 
G : GDP per capita, L: lattitude, C: communist ; M: monarchy ; D: democracy ; O :Openness ; : institution ; F : 
ethnic fractionalization; ME : temperature ; AT : agricultural transition; S : Settlement duration. Obs: 
Observations. Std. Dev: Standard Deviation.  
 
 
3. Empirical results  
The extreme bounds for coefficients are reported in Table 2 along with their 95% confidence 
intervals. This table is presented in four parts. The estimations are based on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with two bounds on the independent variable of interest (high and low) and 
alternative specifications (as shown in the X and Z columns). The high beta ( ) is the 
estimated coefficient from the regression with the extreme high bound (beta plus two standard 
deviations) while the low beta is the coefficient from the regression with the extreme lower 
bound.  
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Table 2. Main results 
 t Obs X Z Robust/fragile 
High 0.758*** 5.3986  G, L, C M, D, O Robust 
Base 0.428* 1.70 73 G, L, C   
Low 0.455**     2.4810  G, L, C M, D, O  
High 0.544*** 3.2574  G, L, C M, I, F Robust 
Base 0.428* 1.70 73 G, L, C   
Low 0.400**     2.1681  G, L, C M, I, F  
High 0.508*** 2.9045  ME, AT, S M, I, F Robust 
Base 0.697** 2.45 62 ME, AT, S   
Low 0.3917***     2.7139  ME, AT, S M, I, F  
High 0.669*** 4.4466  ME, AT, S M, D, O Robust 
Base 0.697** 2.45 62 ME, AT, S   
Low 0.4231**     2.4719  ME, AT, S M, D, O  
 G : GDP per capita, L: lattitude, C: communist ; M: monarchy ; D: democracy ; O: Openness ; I: institutions ; F: 
ethnic fractionalization; ME: temperature ; AT: agricultural transition; S : Settlement duration. ***; **, * 
denotes significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Obs: Observations.  
 
 
As average,  of the intelligence variable varies between 0.4 and 0.7.  We find that this 
coefficient is always significant and its sign does not change. Thus, it is statistically 
reasonable to infer that the relationship between trust and intelligence withstands empirical 
validity. In other word, the relationship is robust. In essence, high levels of intelligence are 
associated with substantial levels of social trust. In other words, countries endowed with high 
IQ also enjoy higher social trust levels. 
 
4. Concluding implications and future directions   
 We have confirmed the findings of previous literature that has established a positive 
relation between the quality human resources and social trust. For example Bjørnskov (2009) 
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has found a positive correlation between social trust and IQ. Whereas the trust variable has 
been used by Bjørnskov (2009) in the conditioning information set as a control variable, we 
have employed it in this study as the dependent variable of interest. We have extended the 
study in the light of previous literature from Leamer (1983, 1985) and Levine and Renelt 
(1992), who had shown that classical regressions are highly sensitive to changes in the 
conditioning information set (or control variables). The extreme bound analysis (EBA) 
technique has been employed to assess the solidity of the relationship between social trust and 
human capital. More specifically, the nexus between IQ and social trust has been assessed and 
a robust relationship between the two variables established.  We have contributed to the 
literature by confirming that the previously established positive linkage between intelligence 
and trust is not statistically fragile. In fact, the nexus withstands further empirical scrutiny 
with more robust empirical strategies. 
 Future studies devoted to improving the extant literature can focus on assessing the 
established linkage throughout the conditional distributions of trust. The motivation 
underlying this recommendation is that the established nexus may depend on initial levels of 
trust such that the sensitivity of the relationship differs in sign and magnitude across countries 
with low, intermediate and high levels of trust.  
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